What if you create a truly unique routing profile that's wildly different from the common ones for which shortcuts were pre-calculated? The system is smart. If it detects that too many shortcuts (~50, for example) need on-the-fly recalculation and deviate significantly, it might determine that falling back to the original, comprehensive A* algorithm for the entire route would actually be faster than doing many small, heavily modified A* calculations.
你脑子里的一个灵感，不用再经过反复的修改和焦躁的等待。敲下回车的瞬间，它就在那里了。自然、简单，且立等可取，这件事听起来平常，但能做到，其实已经很难得了。，更多细节参见同城约会
arr[k++] = leftArr[i++];，这一点在搜狗输入法下载中也有详细论述
The common pattern across all of these seems to be filesystem and network ACLs enforced by the OS, not a separate kernel or hardware boundary. A determined attacker who already has code execution on your machine could potentially bypass Seatbelt or Landlock restrictions through privilege escalation. But that is not the threat model. The threat is an AI agent that is mostly helpful but occasionally careless or confused, and you want guardrails that catch the common failure modes - reading credentials it should not see, making network calls it should not make, writing to paths outside the project.